## IMPLANTABLE RFID

## IS CYBORGIFICATION RIGHT FOR YOU?



## SHOUTS AND GREETS TO CO-PRESENTERS HERE IN SPIRIT



MAX POWER



BABAK JAVADI

HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM



## MANY THANKS TO PIONEERS IN THIS FIELD



Amal Graafstra Dangerous Things



Christian Herrmann "Iceman"

HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM

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Topics	categories + Latest New (4) Unread (2) Top Categories Subscribe			New Topic
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	l dream of Implants 🤹 + Poll		3.8k	2h







# WHO USES ELECTRONIC CREDENTIALS? Image: Comparison of the second secon



















## CREDENTIAL CLONING ATTACKS











This is a "service" being provided with ease by kiosks at hardware stores now. We'll explain why it's so simple and what technology makes it so cheap.





### **CREDENTIAL CLONING IS NOT HARD**

















## HACKING ELECTRONIC CREDENTIALS



## HACKING ELECTRONIC CREDENTIALS




You need three things for a system to be "RFID"









read distances aren't possible over many feet The fob or card has no power of its own (this is why "tracking" is not possible)











### COMMUNICATION BY POWER DRAW





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Dev and his wife Tarah have some unique hands

Injected in between the  $1^{st}$  and  $2^{nd}$  metacarpal of both hands

### EMBEDDED RFID CREDENTIALS



Not a joke... you can come feel them later or watch the video online of me getting mine. ;-)



RFID chips in each hand ... one low freq and one high freq

Tarah had her badge cloned to her hand and can now open all doors at the facility with a literal flick of the wrist. Freaked out the PhysSec guys when she demonstrated it. ;-)

### BIOHACKING: GLASS RFID IMPLANTS



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# BIOHACKING: GLASS RFID IMPLANTS







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Installing the older style "flex" implants was more of a procedure... Scalpels, dermal elevators, etc



I nicknamed these the "mini" flex but they are really just about the full line of flex implants now.



Little bowtie antenna (length can vary)

56 pico farad
30-20 pico farad (Chinese weird chips)
17 pico farad (longer antenna but width remains the same)
20 pico fara
^ they have antennas for all of these ranges



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20 pico fara
^ they have antennas for all of these ranges



4 gauge (~5mm) piercing needle/syringe can be used to install. No knives needed.











Tritium inserts (from cyberize.me and biohack.me ... not as safe)

# BIOHACKING: SUBDERMAL LEDS



# QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS FROM HACKERS






FlexNT is an antenna designed by ClearCo using this inlay Used to be used in rings, etc. But performance is better when flat.

Dangerous Things bought them in bulk from NFCRing and did the encapsulation. Very robust but large. Can go in a middle finger, etc. (Blade and dermal elevator)







Remember, to be RFID all a system needs is...

- 1. Device
- 2. Reader
- 3. Antennas and Inductive Coupling To Communicate









NFC... ISO 14443 FeliCa ISO 18092



(we're going to ignore UHF for now because almost no one is using that for implants and there's basically zero reason you'd want to)



Explain what is meant by "credential type" here... it's both the RFID coupling technology \*AND THE FEATURE SET ON THE CHIP\*



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Fortunately, it's not necessary go out and get a dozen implants all over your body, hah. But more power to you if you want to. =)



We can simplify the landscape considerably. Let's re-make those two Venn Diagram circles.



We've collapsed the Low Frequency side of things to a single name





































T5555 is the same as "Q5" a.k.a. Temic

Temic had their T5551, T5552, T5553, T5554, T5555 and T5557 family.

The others are all T55x7, and the entire family is generally called "T55xx" (as are the proxmark commands, many of which have switches in case someone is using an old Q5 chip)

Atmel T5577, Temic Q5, and EM4x05 / EM4x50 tags can all be used to mimic LF credentials

T55xx is stable and EM4x05/4x50 is experimental today. HID uses EM for their ISOproxII

Link to 0xFFFF 's T55xx block calculator http://cardinfo.barkweb.com.au/index.php?location=19&sub=29






(HID acquired Indala from Motorola in 2003)



(HID acquired Indala from Motorola in 2003)





Now the BIG question



## \$49 Accessing your office or gym or vehicle gate

# <section-header><section-header><section-header><image>

### \$49

Accessing your office or gym or vehicle gate

(some readers will be fussier than others... it depends a lot on coil size with the antennas and also orientation, position, etc. You may have to play a little bit)



Sometimes offices have objected Potential solution: ask about getting an **additional** credential, as opposed to **duplicating** one



### \$49

"xEM access controller" low freq reader (EM mode only) coil antenna is on a coax... so you can place it somewhere white wire outputs 12 volts





Hands-down, the best tool with the greatest functionality

Stock antenna can be iffy, sadly



My friend Naomi did a video about RFID cloning and she showed the proxmark3, as well



My friend Naomi did a video about RFID cloning and she showed the proxmark3, as well



She showed some of the other tools on the market for working with RFID tags, as well



NFC Tool



Using the NFC Tool... kind of janky, but she can make it work on unencrypted tags



Using the NFC Tool... kind of janky, but she can make it work on unencrypted tags



Using the NFC Tool... kind of janky, but she can make it work on unencrypted tags







Have a closer look at that configuration diagram for the T55xx family of chips



Yeah... they support password protection.

And many cheap cloners, for whatever reason, like to set this bit and set their own password



We've had that happen to some folk. It's happened to me, as well. Quite the "oh shit" moment. =)

I had to defuckulate mine, and we also had to do the same for some folk at a DEF CON event in NYC

It's a shame, though, because they have good antennas. Not PERFECT antennas, however



Other products like the Keysy cloner also like to password protect chips

# ANOTHER PROBLEM WITH PROGRAMMING



**Tearing Protection** 

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**Tearing Protection** 



People mod their antennas



Best advice is generally to try to have the implant "cross" the antenna coil at a perpendicular

(you want the "coils" to be in the same geometry with one another)



https://cyborg.ksecsolutions.com/product/proxlf-antenna-for-the-proxmark3-rdv4/

\$45 roughly



Best advice is generally to try to have the implant "parallel" alongside of the antenna coil



Best advice is generally to try to have the implant "parallel" alongside of the antenna coil



I have some with me today to give away



https://datatracker.ietf.org/person/warren@kumari.net

https://github.com/wkumari



Hamspiced's GitHub... https://github.com/hamspiced

Hamspiced's on the Dangerous Things forums... https://forum.dangerousthings.com/u/hamspiced/summary

Hamspiced's Tindie shop... https://tindie.com/stores/hamspiced/

# PROGRAMMING: BOOSTING SIGNAL WITH HAMSPICED'S TANK CIRCUITS



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NFC Forum non-profit March 18, 2004 NXP, Sony, and Nokia

Five distinct tag types that provide different communication speeds and capabilities covering flexibility, memory, security, data retention and write endurance (Type 5 has grown obscure, and is the only example of ISO15693)

HIGH FR	EQUENCY IMF	PLANTS				
	NFC Forum Platform					
	Type 1 NFC-A	Type 2 NFC-A	Type 3 NFC-F	Type 4 NFC-A / NFC-B	Type 5 NFC-V	
Compatible Products	Broadcom Topaz	MIFARE Ultralight MIFARE Ultralight C NTAG 21s (F) NTAG 12C	Sony FeliCia	DESFire SmartMX-JCOP ST Microelectronics	ICODE SLI (x) Ti Tag-It HF-I EM423x ST Microelectronics	
Memory Size	454 Bytes	48 / 128 / 144 / 504 888 / 1904 Bytes	1 / 4 / 9 KBytes	2 / 4/ / 8 KBytes up to 144 KBytes 106 KBytes	32 / 112 / 128 / 160 256 Bytes	
Price	Low	Low	High	Med to High	Low to Medium	
Data Access	Read/Write	Read/Write or Read-only	Read/Write or Read-only	Read/Write or Read-only	Read/Write	
Specification	ISO 14443-3 A	ISO 14443-3 A	JIS 6319-4	ISO 14443-4 A/B	ISO 15693	

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This is also something of an eye chart. Essentially there are a variety of chips that have differing features and protocols. But if they follow NFC spec and certain ISO standards, loads of devices (most notably: smartphones) can talk to them





#### \$70 Type 2 NFC (non-user-changeable CSN/UID)

storing vCard details, BTC addresses, some private strings, or novelty things like links to share

## HIGH FREQUENCY IMPLANTS: XNT - NTAG216



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NTAG 216 (and family)

NTAG FAMILY		
	30 Pieces NTA NFC Tags Stick Amiibo, Fully F and Devices Visit the DEEDYGO Store ***** * 148 rd Price: \$9.88 *prime FI Save up to 19% with bus Number of Items: 30 39.88 50 \$9.88 50 \$9.89 yrime Color Size Material Brand	G215 NFC Stickers, DEEDYGO NXP NTAG215 cers Compatible for TagMo and Nintendo Programmable for All NFC Enabled Phones tings   4 answered questions REE One-Day anses pricing. Sign up for free Amazon Business account
Roll over image to zoom in		
		HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM

NTAG 216 (and family)

Someone may notice that this is NTAG 215

what's the difference among that family of chips?

NTAG FAMILY			
	Ntag213	Ntag215	Ntag216
User Memory	144 Bytes	504 Bytes	888 Bytes
Max URL	136 Chars	488 Chars	872 Chars
Total memory (bytes)	180	540	924
UID (bytes)	7	7	7
		HTTPS://R	EDTEAMALLIANCE.

Only difference is storage capacity

Data transfer rate, Capacitance, endurance cycles, and standards/protocols/features are all the same

All released in 2013 at the same time by NXP. Only difference is storage and cost.



\$120 Type 2 NFC (non-user-changeable CSN/UID)

And an LED in the package User chooses R, G, B, or White

Based on NTAG I2C. Being redesigned. It's going to be the NextV2 as a dual package including a T5577.



#### \$139

Type 4 NFC (non-user-changeable CSN/UID... but you can *randomize* it) 8 kB "application" space (currently out of stock... hard to source the bare die. xDF3 is coming soon in very limited quantity)

stored value and other things tied to a larger framework that events are setting up ships with factory default master keys... EV2 "attempts to solve the master key problem"

can enable "private UID" randomized per session... have to authenticate with chip to see real UID

can set up a secure channel between chip and reader to move data in a secure tunnel



DESFire EV2 is what Disney corp opted to use when they implemented their Magic Band system



#### \$59 A rare Type 5 NFC

13.56MHz ISO15693 & NFC Type 5

(ICODE SLIX2 ... helpful for some devices that require Type 5. padlock, pistol case)



started with a smartcard chip, Apex, and focus on payment features and the like but put on indefinite hold

then it became an identity platform, which is now the Spark2.

(the Spark1 was around but then Google broke their NFC stack and phones couldn't work with the Spark1 for a few years)



#### \$109

Type 4 NFC (non-user-changeable CSN/UID) FIPS 197 compliant

Like other NFC tags... it can pass a URL to a service, etc VivoKey service platform - OpenIDConnect (like "login with Facebook") Wordpress

Discords/Forum vault service (like 1Password/Tresorit/etc)

if you root your phone - possible to do lock/unlock but that feature isn't going to be the norm in future on stock OSs



Spark2 is a symmetric crypto challenge response validation system. There's an API, you can interact with the chip, etc.

SparkActions is a redirector service. Every Spark has a hard-set URL that's unique and interacts with their servers through the API.

SAML identity provider integration... so, sign into GoogleWorkspace, Octa, 1Login, etc.

Spark is NTAG424, very small, 2mm x 12mm injectable. Cryptographic proof of identity. "Unlock my laptop" or "Unlock my phone" may be projects in the works, but they would require the API being online



Common question: "Can I use this to unlock my phone?"

People love the idea of a phone that will only unlock if it's in your own hand (I love this idea, too)

Sadly we're not quite there. Closest we can come is integration with wearables, etc.

"NFC SmartLock" on Google was removed a while ago. Wasn't all that smart, just read the UID, and might have interfered with GooglePay so that's likely why they removed it.



Replacing the Spark

Partnered with Fidesmo

Collaboration with VISA, Mastercard, etc.



#### \$120 MIFARE Classic is **not** *truly* NFC

This can emulate MIFARE Classic S50 credential and has backdoor commands "UID Changeable" chip. (Beware on the market of "change one time" vs "change infinite number of times")



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This can emulate MIFARE Classic S50 credential and has backdoor commands "UID Changeable" chip. (Beware on the market of "change one time" vs "change infinite number of times")



Never lose your hotel key again, no matter how hard you party



Never lose your hotel key again, no matter how hard you party





\$90 hf NFC NTAG and If T5577



\$149

Magic MIFARE + T5577 (they're basically trying to shove a T5577 into everything they do now)

Magic MIFARE now available in gen1a or gen2

FlexUG4 - gen4 Magic MIFARE (can do 4byte, 7byte, Ultralight, MIFARE NTAG)

ZUID - supports gen1a backdoor features and also turn on gen2 and open up sector zero. can recover bad sectors, etc. can't avoid gen1 detection if a reader is smart enough to do that.

DualPackage available... xMAGIC (trying to shove a T5577 into basically everything now)

# REALLY BOLD BIOHACKERS ARE ALWAYS PUSHING THE ENVELOPE





https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Gibson\_JohnnyMnemonic.pdf



https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Gibson\_JohnnyMnemonic.pdf



https://hackaday.com/2019/08/29/pegleg-raspberry-pi-implanted-below-the-skin-not-coming-to-a-store-near-you/



https://www.the-parallax.com/defcon-biohackers-johnny-mnemonic-pegleg/

# PEGLEG PROJECT




### PEGLEG PROJECT











### BIOHACKERS & GRINDERS FTW



PegLeg v1 RasPi with Qi charger and 64GB of memory

PegLeg v2

PiOW (Raspberry Pi Zero W) with a Qi receiver, capacitor, WiFi dongle, and half of a terabyte for storage. Three of them were made for implantation during DEFCON 27



I'm throwing a lot at you, but it's because I want you to understand your options and have all the best info you can before doing something that's kind of significant





NFC rings

Wristbands https://www.aliexpress.us/item/2251832767411687.html



Jakub from Czech Republic

"I have extracted the chip itself from a key fob I got on Ebay for like 2 €. The coil antenna is underneath the PCB, wrapped around the display, and trust me it was very difficult to make the 12ish turns exactly the right width to fit inside the casing, I had to do it like a hundred times because it always was a millimeter too wide or too narrow. Soldering the terminals was also a lot of fun but not as difficult as the previous part. Hope this information makes your presentation even more interesting than it already is."











### DIY RFID NAILS



# DIY RFID NAILS



# MORE QUESTIONS AND CAPABILITIES



### MOBILE PAYMENTS? TRANSPORTATION?







The next generation of implant are already in the works and there are significant inroads happening with integration across other systems Based on SmartMX ... one of NXP's latest chips (it's what HID uses in their SEOS product line of credentials, BTW)

NXP SmartMX3 P71 (JCOP4)

https://www.vivokey.com/apex

As of right now... some transit systems are checking to see if cards respond to "Magic" backdoor commands, and if they do, the system will disable that credential. (Hence the ladders and walls game with new generations of "Magic" card)



This is amazon (or any other retailer with a similar plan) taking biometric data from the user. Implants are not biometric... implants are controlled by the user and they are changeable.



This is amazon (or any other retailer with a similar plan) taking biometric data from the user. Implants are not biometric... implants are controlled by the user and they are changeable.

### This is *NOT* the Future I Want to Experience



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## AND BOLD, AWESOME PEOPLE ARE GETTING US CLOSER!





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### REMEMBER: THE KEY ISSUE IS WHO CONTROLS THE CHIPS AND DATA



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customer often does acetone dissolve themselves

share photos, see if it's chip on board (COB) with plates that get in the way, or MOB package chips (MOB is a term from NXP)

\$200 for "conversion"

- take cred
- pull chip
- test resonance
- test with BNA
- test performance before encapsulation
- encapsulate
- antenna shape is maximum width of 8mm at the widest (little black bowtie)
- allows for use of 4 gauge needle

- (50% refund if it fails)
- (bulk rates at 22 units)

### CUSTOM IMPLANTS AS A SERVICE



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https://musicians.today/@cobalt/112817936307481374



https://musicians.today/@cobalt/112817936307481374

## COMMON QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS





We do plenty of things that hurt... Most folk would say that it's compatible to a piercing, etc. But ask others who've had it done.

### "CAN I USE THEM RIGHT AWAY?"



It's common for the insertion point to swell slightly. This isn't a sign of a problem, it's just the body healing. The swelling can cause extra "distance" between the coil and any reader so for the first few days you might experience intermittent read/write difficulty. (This is less of an issue if you have a ferrite core antenna and an LF credential.)

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Implantable RFID transponders have tested as compatible with MRI machines up to 7 Tesla field strength

But magnetic implants are incompatible with MRI machines and procedures

Think about it... long before humans did this, we've had pet chips. So there has been lots of testing both in field trials and clinical trials.

Non-ferrous, and data is found to still be readable and with good integrity.

There is SOME metal in these devices, however, which can cause artifacts in images acquired. If an implant is close to the region being imaged, the diagnosis may be compromised.

### "ARE THESE SAFE DURING MEDICAL PROCEDURES?"



Deviant's friend Kara. Was having some trouble with balance and walking, eventually taking a hard fall.

Went in for consultation, they wanted to do an MRI. Question of whether she could go through the machine.... Because of implants in her hands.





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https://forum.dangerousthings.com/uploads/default/original/1X/289af3580c98807b dd9de089a27d73f383ce7bce.pdf



They were satisfied and she was put in the imaging machine. Upon exit, her doctors were like, "OK, so we're going to admit you."

"Admit me to a regimen of care? Admit me for monitoring?" she asked. "No, I mean admit you for surgery. Now," they said... practically while scrubbing in.

After the surgery, they told her about the scar tissue, the pressure against her spinal cord, and what a close call this was

# <section-header><section-header>

As opposed to a lifetime of dizziness, pain, and likely becoming a paraplegic... this is her being discharged from the hospital a few weeks after her emergency surgery

### "ARE THESE SAFE DURING MEDICAL PROCEDURES?"



She still currently walks with a cane while continuing physical therapy... but she's alive.

She dodged possibly not being able to walk ever again or possibly dramatically shortening her life because she was able to get that MRI that day.

## 

Amal's work and his kindness to put that document online -- publicly and for free so that anyone who needed this information could have it -- saved her

("take the time to write that blog entry or make that forum post or publish that proof-of-concept or submit to some hacker con CFP now... because you never know whose life your shared knowledge is going to impact years later")

### "How Durable Are These?"



Bioglass (a variant of standard soda-lime glass as opposed to borosilicate glass, etc)

elicits the body collagenizing response does not have biobond like animal tags

(causes inflamatory response -- cancer studies by antis -- and restricts removal)

CyberizeMe/BiohackMe -- makers of Firefly -- implants use flame-sealed process (particulates all around the glass, forms a terrible tension point) Dangerous Things -- implants use laser-sealed process

### "How DURABLE ARE THESE?"



Bioglass (a variant of standard soda-lime glass as opposed to borosilicate glass, etc)

elicits the body collagenizing response does not have biobond like animal tags

(causes inflamatory response -- cancer studies by antis -- and restricts removal)

CyberizeMe/BiohackMe -- makers of Firefly -- implants use flame-sealed process (particulates all around the glass, forms a terrible tension point) Dangerous Things -- implants use laser-sealed process



bashNinja had a MIFARE chip stop working. These have been buggy for some folk, so he had it removed.

This is what was discovered...



...hairline fracture. Could this have caused the failure? Maybe. Could this have happened in his hand? Doubtful. More than likely, this was pre-insertion.

Dangerous Things is inspecting things and checking out QA measures, etc. (unfortunately, no super easy way to inspect an implant before administering it)

Out of many thousands of implants, this is the only one we've ever heard of like this.

### "How Secure Are These?"



So we need to talk about the difference between security ON the CHIP versus ...

... integration with access control SYSTEMS

### "How Secure Are These?"



So we need to talk about the difference between security ON the CHIP versus ...

... integration with access control SYSTEMS



So we need to talk about the difference between security ON the CHIP versus ...

... integration with access control SYSTEMS

"How Secure Are These?"	
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Block 0 contains a Unique ID and some manufacturer information.
"How Secure Are These?"	
"0": "91DD1AE6B008040002EA1CF1517C6C1D"	", "32": "00000000000000000000000000000000000
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"2": "5200040001000000000000000000000000000000	<sup>2</sup> , "34": "0000000000000000000000000000000000",
"3": "00E990B9C9E8FF078069FFFFFFFFFF	, "35": "00E990B9C9E8FF078069FFFFFFFFFFF,
"4": "30000C00000000000000000000000000000000	<sup>2</sup> , <b>"36": "</b> 00000000000000000000000000000000",
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"6": "0000000000000000000000000000000000	, "38": "0000000000000000000000000000,
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"8": "0000000000000000000000000000000000	, <b>"40": "000000000000000000000000000000000</b>
"9": "0000000000000000000000000000000000	, <b>"41": "</b> 00000000000000000000000000000000000
"10": "000000000000000000000000000000000	, <b>"42": "</b> 00000000000000000000000000000000000
"11": "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF078069FFFFFFFFFFFFF	43": "00E990B9C9E8FF078069FFFFFFFFFFF",
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"19": "00E990B9C9E8FF078069FFFFFFFFFFFFF	<pre>', "51": "00E990B9C9E8FF078069FFFFFFFFFFFF",</pre>
"20": "A64B840521DE0079A64B82B8216200AE"	', <b>"52": "</b> 00000000000000000000000000000000000
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	ΗΤΤΟς·//DEDTEAMALLIANCE COM

All these other blocks of data are used for secure storage, however. They have specific keys that control how the data can be accessed, modified, etc

V SECURE ARE THESE!	
"0" . "91DD12F6R008040002F21CF1517C6C1D"	#32#• #0000000000000000000000000000000
"1": "0DC015694D734D05428D2A03D510CD8D".	"33": "000000000000000000000000000000000
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"30": "000000000000000000000000000000000	"62": "000000000000000000000000000000000",
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And in these blocks here, this is where the card has the actual PACS payload and access control credential data stored

"0": "SIDDIAEGB008040002EAICFISI7C6CID",       "32": "00000000000000000000000000000000000	"How Secure Are These?"	
<ul> <li>**IDIALESB000040002ALCH13/X6CL19, *32* *000000000000000000000000000000000</li></ul>		
<ul> <li>"1": "ULCUISES4D/34D05428D2AGUSD10CB8", "34": "U00000000000000000000000000000000000</li></ul>	"0": "91DD1AE6B008040002EA1CF1517C6C1D",	"32": "00000000000000000000000000000000000
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1       1       100290080382010/000971111111111111111111111111111111	"2": "520004000100000000000000000000000",	"34": "00000000000000000000000000000000000
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6 :       000000000000000000000000000000000000	"5": "300000000000000000000000000000000000	"37": "00000000000000000000000000000000000
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"9"       "0000000000000000000000000000000",       "41"       "000000000000000000000000000000000000	"/": "2A2CI3CC242AFF0/8069FFFFFFFFFF",	"39": "00E990B9C9E6F078069FFFFFFFFFF,
"10"       "1000000000000000000000000000000000000	*8*: *0000000000000000000000000000000000	
"11":       "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF	"9": "0000000000000000000000000000000000	
111:       Information         112:       Information         113:       Information         113:       Information         114:       Information         113:       Information         114:       Information <th>"10": "000000000000000000000000000000000</th> <th>"42": "00000000000000000000000000000000000</th>	"10": "000000000000000000000000000000000	"42": "00000000000000000000000000000000000
12:       000000000000000000000000000000000000	11 . FFFFFFFFFFF777777777777777777777777	<b>44</b> 4* <b>*************</b>
13:       000000000000000000000000000000000000	"13": "00000000000000000000000000000000000	"45" · "0000000000000000000000000000000000
111:       000000000000000000000000000000000000	"14": "00000000000000000000000000000000000	<b>46</b> . 000000000000000000000000000000000000
11.5       **A64B787121DE00D9A64B752921620012*,       **44*: **0000000000000000000000000000000	"15"· "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF	47" • "OFFGODECCOUNCECCOUNCECCOUNCECCOUNCECCOUNCE ,
100       1	"16": "A64B787121DE00D9A64B752921620012"	<b>48</b> ** <b>*</b> 000000000000000000000000000000000
11/1       No indextraction of the indext of the indextof the indext of the indext of the indext of th	"17": "A64B80BB21DE002BA64B80C021DE0030"	<b>16</b> • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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"5": "300000000000000000000000000000000000	<pre>"5": "300000000000000000000000000000000000</pre>	*37:       *000000000000000000000000000000000000
"6": "0000000000000000000000000000000000	<pre>"6": "0000000000000000000000000000000000</pre>	**36*:       **00000000000000000000000000000000000
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Now remember... Block 0 is not encrypted

the credential will share this with anyone who queries the card.

# <section-header><section-header>

the difference between security ON the CHIP versus ...

... integration with access control SYSTEMS

# "How Secure Are These?"



the difference between security ON the CHIP versus ...

...integration with access control SYSTEMS

Be cautious of "CSN mode only" locks, etc.

# THE SECURITY RISK OF "CSN MODE" AUTHENTICATION





The difference between security ON the CHIP versus ...

... integration with access control SYSTEMS



There are efforts being made to push for more standards, especially as far as access control is concerned

The LEAF standard has the most promise here

## "Can I Remove It?"



Per Deviant's friend Josh who removed a faulty xM1:

"It was mostly the case of making an incision at one of the short edges and giving it a 'ramp' to slide out of. Then, with some pressure, push it out of the opening enough to grab with tweezers or to make it completely fall out. I'd recommend some topical anesthetic. It wasn't an overall bad or unpleasant experience. Comparable to an x-Series install. Healing time wasn't too bad; the same for any cut given that it's only a small incision, after all."

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Other people have removed theirs over the years, mostly to upgrade to newer ones. Yes, it is possible.

# QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS FROM *NON*-HACKERS













Let's do a rundown / dramatic reading of my top ten favorites

COMMENTS FROM THE INTERNET - #10
OMEGALOVANIA X 5 hours ago They are officially demons
Christaisha Tucker 5 hours ago Did you hear about the pope signing a bill with Islam?

### COMMENTS FROM THE INTERNET - #9

MoreCowbell 2 hours ago (edited) Set the chips on FIRE! I woud never stick that thing in my body even before I woke up.

HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM

COMMENTS FROM THE INTERNET - #8	
tiny c 5 hours ago	
Some believe the mark will reprogram your DNA. Once you get it you can't get the mark out of you	1.
	6014

Сомм	ients From the Internet - #7
S T	even7seven 5 hours ago he RFID chip will contain demon seed DNA and will alter your DNA once inserted. There's no turning back
	Hide 8 replies
2	Frequencies change your DNA. Good frequencies repair, bad frequencies destroy. That is a fact.
6	Mar Sand 5 hours ago Demon seed??!!
	HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM

Сомме	NTS FROM THE INTERNET - #6
Ì	Billy Connelly 5 hours ago Homeboy may or may not know he just got beastied & signed his own death warrant.
	Judah Awake 5 hours ago He's going straight to hell, I hope he's excited for God's infinite OVEN 🙆 🙆 🕭 💼 8 🗣 REPLY
	HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM

Сомме	NTS FROM THE INTERNET - #5
S	Scruffy and JBZ11 Gamers 2 weeks ago Btw in the Bible you are not supposed to get the chip I am sorry but people who do are going to hell 1 1 I REPLY Hide reply The Modern Rogue 1 week ago You're not my real minister. 1 I REPLY
	HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM

Соми	ients From the Internet - #4
	horsefaceemily 5 hours ago
	Once that chips In side you your a walking meat ball, they can kill you with the flip of a switch !.
	138 📲 REPLY
	<ul> <li>Hide 14 replies</li> </ul>
	Sherry Sunshine 5 hours ago
	Yup, one pulse of power and there goes your heartbeat.
	1 21 📲 REPLY
	Antonjlavey 4 hours ago
	5G will do that to us
	11 📲 REPLY
	HTTPS://REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM

Сомме	ents From the Internet - #3 🐻
٩	Th3lite 5 hours ago (edited) May the forces behind these evil agendas all be eaten alive by a sworn of lucust.
	HTTPS://REDTFAMALLIANCE COM

Сом	IMENTS FROM THE INTERNET - #2 🔞
9	Lindy LeFlore 5 hours ago (edited) How creepy are those guys? They make it sooooooo funny too! AHAHAHAHA – NOT! Your DNA will be changed by the chip! Sadly, we now see two guys in the ad that are now destined for hell! Great! So fun, so funny! NOT!!!!!
	<ul> <li>Hide 10 replies</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>D.O.P. 57 3 hours ago</li> <li>Two of them looked like illuminati soyboys.</li> <li>7 9 REPLY</li> </ul>
	Level World 3 hours ago They're the biggest geeks I've ever seen in my life. Pure human trash (not that I'm hatingbut it has to be said).
	ΗΤΤΡΟΟ//ΡΕΝΤΕΔΜΔΙ Ι ΙΔΝΙΟΕ ΟΟΜ



Comments From the Internet - #1 🐧
So Soap 5 hours ago People are getting dumber and dumber God Help us!!!!! 56 P REPLY View 3 replies DeviantOllam 1 second ago you have no idea how right you are.
HTTPS:// <mark>REDTEAMALLIANCE.COM</mark>



So it's easy (terribly easy, as it turns out) to simply dismiss these folk all as scientifically-illiterate nutters and bible thumpers.

But we should recognize that there are people out there who are genuinely in pain every day because of mental difficulties... and these technologies -- and the conspiracy fantasies surrounding them -- feed their fears and delusions, while the internet helps them connect with one another and reinforce their misguidedness



https://www.wired.com/story/mind-games-the-tortured-lives-of-targeted-individuals/



And there are scammers out there who prey on people that believe themselves to be "targeted" by radio waves and other technologies that they do not understand.

People take money from and further victimize these folk by playing into their beliefs



And there are scammers out there who prey on people that believe themselves to be "targeted" by radio waves and other technologies that they do not understand.

People take money from and further victimize these folk by playing into their beliefs





We do this on the floor at RSA

We do this in our communities

We can help here, too... but not with harsh criticism

## HACKERS FIGHT SNAKE OIL



While this in-your-face approach is appropriate and effective in fights against big entities, that is not exactly the landscape here

## HELP THOSE WHO NEED HELP



Fred Rogers spoke of how the most vulnerable among us have "deep feelings" even if they seem immature

When they face crisis, Fred offered "a plea not to leave them isolated... And at the mercy of their own feelings and their own fantasies of loss and destruction."

Striving to understand and better respond... That's a most important task


https://forum.dangerousthings.com/t/so-you-think-youve-been-implanted-againstyour-will/64

Amal did loads of amazing emotional work in this write-up

"Humans have evolved to imagine the future, they just haven't evolved yet to believe it."



We live in an increasingly connected yet also increasingly isolated society

President Johnson asked of our society and new technologies "how will we use our miracles?"



People without access to proper safety nets slip through the cracks and can have their lives fall apart



Destigmatize counseling and mental healthcare... and demand that legislators make costs no longer a barrier

## HELP THOSE WHO NEED HELP



If you have the time and the spoons for it, do outreach in your communities and simply among your friends and families. People with good ties and healthy relationships are more likely to get help with delusions and they are far less susceptible to becoming swept up in internet conspiracy fantasies or bilked by scam "solutions" from charlatans

It's similar to how you have to deal with family members and loved ones who are regular consumers of outlets like Fox News...

- 1. You have to deactivate their amygdala
- 2. Finding common ground through questions about shared values
- 3. Act like you don't understand and ask them to explain
- 4. Eventually, ask about what the motivations could be for alleged boogeymen "How would that strategy work?" "How would they go about doing that?" "How would that play out... what kind of laws and policies would it take?"

Be good to one another and be close to those who matter to you

